Debates concerning the relationship between Tridentine Catholicism and Catholicism after Vatican II dominate theological conversation today, particularly with regard to understandings of the Church and its engagement with the world. Current historical narratives paint ecclesiology after the Council of Trent as dominated by juridical concerns, uniformity, and institutionalism. Purportedly neglected are the spiritual, diverse, and missional aspects of the Church. This book challenges such narratives by investigating the Spanish Jesuit Francisco Suárez's theology of ecclesial unity and catholicity. Analyzing standard as (...) well as overlooked sources of Suárez's ecclesiology, the author shows how Suárez wrestles with the new demands of his time and anticipates later ecumenical developments in twentieth-century Catholic ecclesiology. Early modern expansion prompted theologians after Trent to reckon with the ecclesial status of baptized Protestants, the Greek Orthodox, and non-believers in the New World. It further prompted reflection on the universality, or catholicity, of the Church, and how the Church's mission to the nations serves her greater unity in Christ. Throughout this exposition, the author reveals Suárez's vision of the Church to be deeply spiritual, diverse, and missional-not at the expense of the institutional, but as it's necessary and life-giving source. The Church, for Suárez, is primarily a way of life. This book explores not only Suárez's speculative ecclesiology, but how the unity and catholicity of the body of Christ is lived out in practice, that is, in the worship and works of the faithful, and, most notably, in the charism of his own religious order, the Society of Jesus. Suárez thus shows his readers what the spiritual dynamic between Christic unity and missional catholicity should look like in the Church. (shrink)

The organization of the modern police is a contingent social choice about how to engage in the process of governance when regulating public order on the street. The police are the agency authorized to act upon the state’s duty to govern in response to public emergencies. The duty to govern exists when there is some urgent social need that could be resolved by acting, and some person or institution has the resources and ability to do that act. The duty is (...) impersonal: anybody with the relevant skill set is obligated to act to address the relevant need. Problems can arise, however, when too few individuals respond or too many compete to resolve the need. A core feature of governance, then, is to create publicly recognized institutions with special authority, resources, and abilities to address the demand for public services when someone needs to step in and do something to the exclusion of ordinary members of the public. Police agencies are further characterized by various powers and duties. These powers are normative powers to change the legal status of the people with whom the police interact, rather than physical powers to use some amount of violence to coerce individuals to comply with police demands. The core powers of the police include the powers to make authoritative determinations about how to respond to an emergency, to detain individuals, and to trespass upon their person or property, along with conjoined duties to govern, to protect, and to intervene at risk to themselves. The dominant approach attempts to distinguish the police from other institutions using the police ability to use violent to respond to public emergencies. On the governance based model of the police, however, the ability to use force is simply one of the resources available to the police, and does not mark them off as different from other public governance agencies. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: “You're Right. There's No Earth. It's All a Legend” “I'm Not a Cylon!…Maybe, But We Just Can't Take That Chance” “You Have to Have Something to Live For. Let it be Earth” Notes.

The Supremacy of Love advocates an agape-centered vision of virtue ethics, combining traditional Aristotelian ethics with insights from Thomas Aquinas. It shows why virtue is good for the virtuous individual, reimagines impartiality so that it is compatible with close personal relationships, and has pluralistic cross-cultural applications.

" Dr. Cassell discusses the world of the sick, the healing connection and healer's battle, the role of omnipotence in the healer's art, illness and disease, and ...

Within the epistemology of the sciences, conventionalism has been the subject of regular criticism for over six decades. Critics such as W. V. Quine and Morton White, and more recently Nathan Salmon (1992), and Paul Boghossian (1996), have attacked even the most basic tenet of conventionalism, namely its claim that the truth of certain statements is fixed not by stipulation-independent facts, but by the conventions governing the meaning of those statements and their constituents.

The most up-to-date philosophical discussion of the quasi-historical fantasy television show Game of ThronesThe Ultimate Game of Thrones and Philosophy treats fans to dozens of new essays by experts who examine philosophical questions raised by the Game of Thrones story.

Quality-of-life policing, responsive to the concerns of urban communities, presents a profound paradox. On the one hand, the collateral effects of drug use, especially in public and in racially fragmented, low-income communities, result in levels of crime and fear of crime that renders the communities almost uninhabitable; on the other, the collateral effects of policing drug crime, for these same communities, destroy the community's human fabric. A "new" generation of legal scholars have embraced and transformed the Broken Windows model of (...) policing urban communities. These theorists share a "social norms"perspective: they suggest that law's direct threat of imposing sanctions is not the sole means of constraining conduct. A variety of other devices, including non-legal, "social" norms, may supplement the law's coercive power. The social norms "take" on the Broken Windows argument is that public low-level crime undermines the social structures of local communities. Inner city blight sends a distinct message: that community members reject or ignore norms supporting law-abiding behavior in favor of norms supporting law-breaking. Accordingly, social norms theorists advocate empowering police and local communities through a variety of traditional and newly minted public order offenses (such as anti-loitering statutes and youth curfews) as means of attacking high crime in urban and predominantly minority neighborhoods. In this article, I take up the challenge of public order policing. My claim is that the sort of preventative policing social norms theorists advocate can and should be separated from reactive "investigative" policing directed at apprehending criminals. Separating preventative and investigative policing means that the police, as currently constituted, are the wrong people to engage in preventative policing. Instead, the appropriate people include municipal officials with no power to engage in investigation but who have the authority to enforce norms of public order. My proposal is to radically restructure the manner in which we think about the legitimacy of various policing practices and the type of authority the police wield. Our current focus on constitutional remedies for low-level police abuses has failed to ameliorate the justified resentment expressed by individuals and local communities subject to heightened amounts of increasingly invasive policing.The attempt to limit police authority through prospective constitutional (and other) norms that control their ability to search, seize, and interrogate suspects is properly confined to the police's investigative role. Limits do not work to constrain their ability to police public order and engage in crime prevention. Yet even at the investigative stage, the Court has already replaced the rule-based due-process model of authority with a series of role-based exceptions to the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments' constitutional requirements. Both role- and rule-based concepts of authority concern the proper scope of legitimate authority. Rule-based authority has its basis in adherence to the content of particular rules; role-based authority is based in the powers afforded individuals in particular roles of public authority. Whereas rule-based authority derives its legitimacy primarily from the government's right to promulgate norms, role-based authority gains legitimacy from the degree to which the official's role is matched to the circumstances triggering authority. (shrink)

It is well known that Max Scheler framed his ethics in opposition to Kant’s “formalistic” ethical framework. However, it is a lesser-known fact that Scheler offered a critique of the ancient Greek moral vision. Although this critique was less developed than the one of Kant, the critique of the ancients was no less significant. First explicated in 1912 in Ressentiment, its central theme is reprised in nearly all of Scheler’s main texts even up until his death. Scheler’s contention is with (...) what he calls the “love of goodness,” which he also happens to think Aristotle’s ethics represents. This paper will primarily examine the love of goodness, first, as one side of the “categorial form” of "Pharisaism"—that is, as it represents a “moral illusion”—then as the other side—namely, as it corresponds to “epistemological error." Finally, I consider the specific moral context in light of where it naturally leads Scheler: to the principle of solidarity. (shrink)

Various, albeit largely incongruent, attempts have been made at demonstrating the critical force of phenomenology. Mohr seeks to rekindle the project by accentuating the critical potential hidden within a core phenomenological presupposition: the discrepancy between conceptual and intuitive meaning (logos and phenomenon). Phenomenological attention on the discrepancy itself as an experienced phenomenon constitutes the starting point of critical phenomenology. While Adorno famously rejects intuition as a viable candidate for grounding critique, Mohr argues that reflection on lived experiences and the nonformal (...) meanings they yield provide a robust source for critical self-reflection. As such, ideology may be most effectively unmasked by means of a proper attitudinal orientation to the intuitive meanings within one’s lived social experiences. (shrink)

Healers: Extraordinary Clinicians at Work, by David Schenck and Larry R. Churchill, and What Patients Teach: The Everyday Ethics of Health Care, by Churchill, Joseph B. Fanning, and Schenck are both important and thought‐inspiring books. For the first, Schenck and Churchill recruited fifty practitioners, mostly physicians but some clinicians who practice alternative therapies, “identified by their peers as excellent healers,” and interviewed them to find out what they did to establish a good relationship with their patients. The results of their (...) interviews and how they wrote their book makes this the best and most concrete understanding of a necessary step to healing that I have read. What Patients Teach examines the patients’ perspective about forming relationships with their clinicians. The patients’ clinicians were asked to nominate patients to be interviewed to help answer the question. This volume, while important, is less extraordinary than the first because we hear less what the patients want to say and more what the authors want to tell us. That aside, taken together, these two books are a major advance in the literature of healing. (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article: Thinking Clearly About Death. By Jay F. Rosenberg.

As the demand for prosthetic limbs with reliable and multi-functional control increases, recent advances in myoelectric pattern recognition and implanted sensors have proven considerably advantageous. Additionally, sensory feedback from the prosthesis can be achieved via stimulation of the residual nerves, enabling closed-loop control over the prosthesis. However, this stimulation can cause interfering artifacts in the electromyographic (EMG) signals which deteriorate the reliability and function of the prosthesis. Here, we implement two real-time stimulation artifact removal algorithms, Template Subtraction (TS) and ε-Normalized (...) Least Mean Squares (ε-NLMS), and investigate their performance in offline and real-time myoelectric pattern recognition in two transhumeral amputees implanted with nerve cuff and EMG electrodes. We show that both algorithms are capable of significantly improving signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and offline pattern recognition accuracy of artifact-corrupted EMG signals. Furthermore, both algorithms improved real-time decoding of motor intention during active neurostimulation. Although these outcomes are dependent on the user-specific sensor locations and neurostimulation settings, they nonetheless represent progress toward bi-directional neuromusculoskeletal prostheses capable of multifunction control and simultaneous sensory feedback. (shrink)

This collection features essays from top experts in ethics and philosophy of love that offer varying perspectives on the value of a contemporary secular virtue of chastity. The virtue of chastity has traditionally been portrayed as an excellent personal disposition concerning the ideal ordering of sexual desire such that the person desires that which is actually good for both the self and others affected by his or her sexual desires and actions. Yet, for roughly the past half century chastity has (...) been increasingly portrayed as an unnecessary ideal with few secular benefits that could not be otherwise obtained. Instead, chastity is sometimes portrayed as an odd kind of religious asceticism with few secular benefits. The essays in this volume ask whether there may be advantages to reconsidering a contemporary virtue of chastity. A recovered and reconceptualized concept of chastity can offer partial solutions to problems associated with externalized sexual desire, including sweeping patterns of sexual harassment, the high divorce/relationship-failure rate, and widespread pornography use. Sexual Ethics in a Secular Age will appeal to researchers and advanced students interested in the philosophy of sex and love, virtue ethics, and philosophical accounts of secularity. (shrink)

Much of the recent work on oncogenes has been interpreted as signifying that the cancerous phenotype is caused by the direct expression of ‘dominantly‐acting’ oncogenes. On the other hand, numerous somatic cell hybridization experiments suggest that there are potent tumour‐suppressor genes in the genome. The conflict between the observations and the possible nature of the relationships between oncogenes and tumour‐suppressor are discussed.

Medicine and ethics alike must learn properly to attend to suffering. We can never truly experience another's distress. We can, however, learn to recognize the particular purposes, values, and aesthetic responses that shape the sense of self whose integrity is threatened by pain, disease, and the mischances of life.

Peter Blickle, the great scholar of the German Peasants' War of 1525, has asserted that “in the late Middle Ages Europe saw itself confronted with a phenomenon which had been unknown in the previous history of the west—the peasant rebellion.” Is it indeed true that there are no reports of peasant revolts before the fourteenth century and in the early Middle Ages in particular? If one were to answer this question based on the Western scholarship of popular uprisings that has (...) flourished over the last few decades, one might concur with Blickle, since this research has focused almost exclusively on the fourteenth through sixteenth centuries. Yet there are a few recorded examples of peasant rebellions from the early Middle Ages, although dramatically fewer than in the late Middle Ages and the early modern period. The early-medieval revolt about which we have the most information is the Saxon Stellinga uprising of 841–42. Gerward, the author of the Annals of Xanten, described this revolt with the following words: “That same year throughout all of Saxony the power of the slaves rose up violently against their lords. They usurped for themselves the name Stellinga [apparently Old Saxon for ‘companions’ or ‘comrades’], and they perpetrated much madness. And the nobles of that land were violently persecuted and humiliated by the slaves.” As the only recorded European popular revolt between the sixth and tenth century, the rebellion of the Saxon Stellinga demands an explanation. (shrink)

During his career, Ronald Dworkin wrote extensively on an impressive range of issues in moral, political, and legal philosophy, but, like many of his contemporaries, international law remained a topic of relative neglect. His most sustained work on international law is a posthumously published article, “A New Philosophy for International Law” (2013), which displays some familiar aspects of his views in general jurisprudence, in addition to some novel (though perhaps surprising) arguments as well. This paper argues that the moralized account (...) of international law we might have expected is conspicuously missing from this posthumous article; with Dworkin advancing an argument based on a form of political realism instead. (shrink)

We review research suggesting that several of the functions attributed to fear, in the target article's fearful ape hypothesis, also apply to supplication and appeasement emotions. These emotions facilitate support provisioning from others and the formation and maintenance of cooperative relationships. We therefore propose that the fearful ape hypothesis be expanded to include several other distinctively human emotional tendencies.

Mister Rogers’ Neighborhood, which began as The Children’s Corner in 1953 and terminated in 2001, left its mark on America. The show’s message of kindness, simplicity, and individual uniqueness made Rogers a beloved personality, while also provoking some criticism because, by arguing that everyone was special without having to do anything to earn it, the show supposedly created an entitled generation. -/- In Mister Rogers and Philosophy, thirty philosophers give their very different takes on the Neighborhood phenomenon.

I explore the critical significance of the phenomenological notion of intuition. I argue that there is no meaning that is originally formal-conceptual. The meanings of concepts function as symbolic approximations to original nonconceptual, intuitive givens. However, the meaning content originally intuitively given in lived experience has a tendency to be lost in pursuit of universalizability and communicability of conceptual content. Over time, conceptual approximations lose their reference to the experience that had given them their meaning in the first place. The (...) loss of an experiential reference makes for a vacuous set of concepts, giving way to ideologies, by which I mean the conscious prejudicial support for a set of ideas without the experiential, intuitive context that is necessary to see the value of those ideas. A critical phenomenology is a critique of ideological views by descriptively recovering the intuitive content whereby concepts can be adequately reevaluated. -/- This main aim of this work is to establish the methodological features of critical phenomenology by responding to the objections made against phenomenology and intuition by Frankfurt School critical theorists. Scheler’s phenomenology is used as a way forward due to his far-reaching critique of reason and emphasis on the phenomenological intuition of value. -/- Chapter 1 considers three Frankfurt School objections of Husserlian phenomenology, as (1) immanentist (Adorno), (2) idealist (Adorno), and (3) normatively empty (Habermas). Each fail to discern the subtle features of nonidentity with respect to Husserl’s notions of apperception and adumbrated phenomena. -/- Chapter 2 shows how Scheler’s original view of the phenomenological attitude makes more explicit Husserl’s subtle dialectical elements. Adequate and inadequate givenness is interpreted with respect to one’s intentional orientation and the moral attitudes carried within the world, influencing the content of the given. -/- Chapter 3 confronts the popular charge of idealism. Reality is a problem for phenomenology only to conscious modes of givenness. But through ecstatic modes of givenness (in resistances) Scheler’s phenomenology achieves an existential ground that is crucial for phenomenology to engage actually existing social structures and factors. -/- Chapter 4 concerns the charge that phenomenology is normatively empty. That Scheler had developed a theory of value is not enough to rebut the charge but his view of value-givenness as an attitude informed by the act of loving, opens an awareness of the values disclosed by that attitude. -/- Chapter 5 shows that Scheler’s sociology of knowledge, in contrast to Karl Mannheim’s interpretation, provides a unified picture of the interdependency of spirit and life needed for the realization of values in the world and society. -/- Chapter 6 suggests a way of framing a phenomenological critique of ideology. Scheler points to the attitudinal factors of loving and hating to disclose systemic devaluation and overvaluation. This awareness arises (1) from noticing how individual valuation reflects social valuation, and (2) by being attuned to how one’s own intuitions contradict prevailing social valuation and thought, thereby opening a space for a critique of those patterns. (shrink)

Felony disenfranchisement is best understood as a means of vote suppression. Quite apart from its significance as a form of criminal stigma, disenfranchisement is most properly characterized as one of the ways in which the American voting system reserves political participation for a privileged social and intellectual class. Thus understood, felony disenfranchisement reveals the theoretical underpinnings of an exclusionary version of American democracy in which more or less widespread disenfranchisement is an acceptable or necessary political tactic. Felony disenfranchisement should not (...) be characterized as a sanction for criminal conduct: It fits none of the usual justifications for punishment. Most commentators agree that felony disenfranchisement as a collateral sanction for criminal conduct stigmatizes alike a disparate collection of individuals convicted of crimes carrying a penalty of one year or more - everything from drug possession to murder - and extends, in many instances, long after former felons have completed their sentences. Justifications for refusing the vote to felons, and to former felons who are no longer incarcerated, are surprisingly weak and clearly related to larger issues of democratic participation. Accordingly, it is under the framework of democratic participation that the most persuasive justifications of disenfranchisement might be found. Under the framework of democratic participation, the disenfranchisement debate implicates competing theories of democracy, each of which has profound consequences for the constitution of the American polity. I contend that there are currently three models for the right to vote in American society: (1) a membership model premised upon popular participation in the democratic process as an expression of citizenship; (2) a deliberative model in which popular participation is conditioned upon the duty to be an informed and reflective citizen; and (3) an elite model entrenching political office in a political class that competes for votes among the electoral masses. The continuing vitality of these three models at the level of political debate and constitutional doctrine unsettles the dominant history of the franchise as one of progress from an exclusionary to an inclusionary extension of the mandate, and requires us to acknowledge felony disenfranchisement as part of a larger process of voter exclusion and suppression. (shrink)

Prevailing accounts of the relationship between rights and identity impose a false choice between conceptions of rights as the instrument of self-invention or the foil to collective virtue. This article proposes an alternative conception of rights as constitutive of social relations and aspects of individual identity. To do so, it draws on H. L. A. Hart's famous distinction between special and general rights, and it describes the exclusionary and inclusionary conditions under which these forms of right constitute social groups and (...) self-meaning. Further, it specifies a pure form of «constitutive right», overlooked in Hart's typology, but extant in modern liberal, pluralistic societies, that inherently differentiates among persons and so directly constitutes aspects of human identity. (shrink)

To the Editor: Daniel Callahan is correct when, in “Rationing: Theory, Politics, and Passions”, he tells us that the combination of ever-rising medical costs and ever-increasing demand for expensive resources by physicians and their patients will—in the absence of any workable, generally acceptable mode of official rationing—lead to covert rationing. Or, more precisely, it will encourage us to extend the covert rationing that already exists, where those with more get more. As things stand now, this is unavoidable. However..

The Nature of Suffering underscores the change that is taking place in medicine from a basic concern with disease to a greater focus on the sick person. Cassell centers his discussion on the problem of suffering because, he says, its recognition and relief are a test of the adequacy of any system of medicine. He describes what suffering is and its relationship to the sick person: bodies do not suffer, people do. An exclusive concern with scientific knowledge of the body (...) and disease, therefore, impedes an understanding of suffering and diminishes the care of the suffering patient. The growing criticism that medicine is not sufficiently humanistic does not go deep enough to provide a basis for a new understanding of medicine. New concepts in medicine must have their basis in its history and in the development of ideas about disease and treatment. Cassell uses many stories about patients to demonstrate that, despite the current dominance of science and technology, there can be no diagnosis, search for the cause of the patient's disease, prognostication, or treatment without consideration of the individual sick person. Recent trends in medicine and society, Cassell believes, show that it is time for the sick person to be not merely an important concern for physicians but the central focus of medicine. He addresses the exciting problems involved in such a shift. In this new medicine, doctors would have to know the person as well as they know the disease. What are persons, however, and how are doctors to comprehend them? The kinds of knowledge involved are varied, including values and aesthetics as well as science. In the process of knowing the experience of patient and doctor move to center stage. He believes that the exploration of the person will engage medicine in the 21st century just as understanding the body has occupied the last hundred years. (shrink)

The way information and communication technology (ICT) develops can promote or hinder the democratic potential of this critical societal infrastructure. Concerns about the role standards development organizations (SDOs) play in this context predate the “digital age” but are reemerging amid substantial changes in the institutional landscape of standardization. This article explores the increasingly critical link between the institutional design of SDOs and the democratic design of ICT. We review some principles of democracy in terms of the design of technology, apply (...) these to standardization, and discuss the role public policy may play here, while distinguishing between input and output legitimacy. (shrink)

Wittgenstein's Tractatus carefully distinguished the concept all from\nthe notion of a truth-function, and thereby from the quantifiers.\nI argue that Wittgenstein's rationale for this distinction is lost\nunless propositional functions are understood within the context\nof his picture theory of the proposition. Using a model Tractatus\nlanguage, I show how there are two distinct forms of generality implicit\nin quantified Tractatus propositions. Although the explanation given\nin the Tractatus for this distinction is ultimately flawed, the distinction\nitself is a genuine one, and the forms of generality that (...) Wittgenstein\nindicated can be seen in the quantified sentences of contemporary\nlogic. (shrink)